Literature Review on Education in War Torn Countries
BMJ. 2002 Feb 9; 324(7333): 342–345.
Root causes of violent conflict in developing countries
Poverty and political, social, and economical inequalities betwixt groups predispose to conflict; policies to tackle them will reduce this chance
8 out of 10 of the world's poorest countries are suffering, or accept recently suffered, from large scale violent conflict. Wars in developing countries have heavy human, economic, and social costs and are a major cause of poverty and underdevelopment. The extra baby deaths caused by the war in Cambodia, for example, were estimated to exist three% of the country'south 1990 population.one Most current conflicts, such as in the Sudan or the Congo, are within states, although there is ofttimes considerable outside intervention, as in Afghanistan. In the past 30 years Africa has been especially badly affected by war (see fig 1).
Number of armed conflicts past level, 1946–2000. (Adapted from Gleditsch NP, Wallensteen P, Eriksson M, Sollenberg M, Strand H. Armed conflict 1946-2000: a new dataset. www.pcr.uu.se/workpapers.html)
This article reviews the evidence on the root causes of disharmonize and suggests some policy responses that should be adopted to reduce the likelihood of future war.
The cultural dimension of war
Many groups of people who fight together perceive themselves as belonging to a common culture (ethnic or religious), and part of the reason that they are fighting may exist to maintain their cultural autonomy. For this reason, at that place is a tendency to attribute wars to "primordial" ethnic passions, which makes them seem intractable. This view is not correct, withal, and diverts attention from important underlying economic and political factors.
Although a person's culture is partly inherited it is besides constructed and chosen, and many people have multiple identities.two Many of the ethnic identities in Africa that today seem to be and then strong were "invented" by the colonial powers for administrative purposes and take only weak origins in precolonial Africa.three Their boundaries are generally fluid, and they have rightly been described every bit "fuzzy sets."iv
In wars political leaders may deliberately "rework historical memories" to engender or strengthen this identity in the contest for power and resources. For example, in the disharmonize in Matebeland in mail-independence Zimbabwe, Ndebele identity was used to advance political objectives.5 Other well known examples include the Nazis in Germany, the Hutus in Rwanda (fig 2), and, today, the emphasis on Muslim consciousness by the Taliban and others.
Victims of a massacre past Hutus in Rwanda
Economical factors which predispose to war
Iv economic hypotheses have been put forward to explicate intra-state wars, based on factors related to group motivation, individual motivation, failure of the social contract, and ecology deposition.
Group motivation hypothesis—Since intra-state wars mainly consist of fighting betwixt groups, group motives, resentments, and ambitions provide motivation for state of war.4 ,6 ,vii Groups may exist divided along cultural or religious lines, by geography, or by form. Group differences only become worth fighting for, however, if there are other of import differences betwixt groups, particularly in the distribution and practice of political and economical power.eight In this situation relatively deprived groups are likely to seek (or exist persuaded by their leaders to seek) redress. Where political redress is not possible they may resort to war. Resentments inspired by group differences, termed horizontal inequalities, are a major crusade of state of war. These group differences have many dimensions—economical, political, and social (see table ). Relatively privileged groups may likewise be motivated to fight to protect their privileges against set on from relatively deprived groups.6
Private motivation hypothesis—War confers benefits on individuals as well every bit costs which can motivate people to fight.ix ,10 Immature uneducated men, in item, may gain employment as soldiers. War too generates opportunities to boodle, profiteer from shortages and from aid, trade artillery, and bear out illicit production and trade in drugs, diamonds, timber, and other commodities. Where alternative opportunities are few, because of low incomes and poor employment, and the possibilities of enrichment by war are considerable, the incidence and duration of wars are likely to be greater. This "greed hypothesis" has its base of operations in rational choice economics.x ,11
Failure of the social contract—This derives from the view that social stability is based on a hypothetical social contract betwixt the people and the authorities. People take state say-so so long as the state delivers services and provides reasonable economic weather condition (employment and incomes). With economical stagnation or pass up, and worsening state services, the social contract breaks down, and violence results. Hence high and ascent levels of poverty and a decline in state services would be expected to cause conflict.12
Light-green war hypothesis—This points to ecology deposition as a source of poverty and cause of conflict.thirteen ,xiv For example, rising population pressure level and falling agronomical productivity may lead to state disputes. Growing scarcity of h2o may provoke conflict.15 This hypothesis contradicts the view that people fight to secure control over environmental riches.ten ,16
The 4 hypotheses are not mutually sectional. For instance, the disharmonize in the Sudan is an example of both horizontal inequality (with people in the south being heavily deprived) and powerful private gains that perpetuate the struggle.9 While environmental poverty has plausibly been an important factor in the disharmonize in Rwanda, it does non seem to have been in the former Yugoslavia.
The evidence underpinning the hypotheses
Prove from case studies and statistical analyses suggest that each hypothesis has something to contribute to explaining conflict.
Group inequality—There is consequent prove of sharp horizontal inequalities between groups in conflict.17 Group inequalities in political admission are invariably observed—hence the resort to violence rather than seeking to resolve differences through political negotiation. Group inequalities in economic dimensions are common, although not invariably large (such equally in Bosniaxviii). Horizontal inequalities are most likely to lead to conflict where they are substantial, consistent, and increasing over time. Although systematic cross country evidence is rare, one study classified 233 politicised communal groups in 93 countries according to political, economical, and ecological differences and plant that most groups suffering horizontal inequalities had taken some action to assert group interests, ranging from not-violent protestation to rebellion.4
Private motivation—The view that private motivation plays an of import part in prolonging, if not causing, conflict in some countries is well supported by work in the Sudan, Sierra Leone, and Liberia.9 ,19 ,twenty Collier and Hoeffler tested the greed hypothesis (albeit with a rather crude measure of resource riches) and found a meaning association with disharmonize, although this has been challenged.21 They also institute that greater male person education to higher secondary level reduced the risk of state of war. They concluded that "greed" outperforms grievance in explaining disharmonize.
Failure of the social contract—Econometric studies testify that the incidence of conflict is higher among countries with low per capita incomes, life expectancy, and economical growth.x ,12 ,22 However, many statistical investigations of the clan between vertical income distribution and conflict produce differing results.10 ,12 ,23 Information technology has been suggested that funding programmes from the International Monetary Fund—usually associated with cuts in government services—crusade conflicts, but neither statistical nor instance report bear witness supports this, perhaps because countries on the verge of disharmonize practice not generally qualify for such programmes.12 ,24
Green war hypothesis—Here the testify is contradictory. It seems that both ecology poverty and resource riches can be associated with disharmonize.13 ,sixteen ,25 Environmental stress tends to make people decumbent to violence equally they seek alternatives to drastic situations (as in Rwanda), while resources riches give strong motivation to particular groups to gain control over such resource (as in Sierra Leone).
Although none of the four hypotheses solely explains all conflicts, they exercise identify factors likely to predispose groups to conflict. Clearly some explanations concord in some situations and not in others, but one factor that all studies have found to be of import is a history of conflict. This is because the same structural factors that predisposed to state of war initially often go along, and because mobilising people by calling on group memories is more effective if there is a history of disharmonize.
Policies to reduce the likelihood of war
The research summarised above suggests some of import policy conclusions for disharmonize-prone countries. I is that policies to tackle poverty and environmental degradation will reduce the likelihood of war, as well as being critical development objectives. Reducing big horizontal inequalities is essential to eliminate a major source of conflict. Policies that diminish individual incentives to fight, especially in one case disharmonize is under manner, are too needed. Above all, at that place is a demand to secure inclusive government—from political, economic, and social perspectives—and a flourishing economy so that all major groups and nigh individuals proceeds from participation in the normal economic system.
From a political perspective, inclusive government is not simply a matter of democracy; bulk based democracy tin can lead to oppression of minorities. Conflict is greatest in semi-democracies or governments in transition and least among established democracies and disciplinarian regimes.26 Democratic institutions must exist inclusive at all levels—for case, voting systems should ensure that all major groups are represented in government. The contempo constitution adopted for government in Northern Ireland and the proposals for Transitional islamic state of afghanistan and Burundi are examples of this.
Economic and social policies are needed to systematically reduce horizontal inequalities. Policies towards investment, employment, education, and other social services should aim at reducing imbalances and inequalities. Such policies demand to exist introduced charily since action to right horizontal inequalities has occasionally provoked conflict by the grouping whose privileged position is being weakened, notably in Sri Lanka.
A major trouble is that the authorities of a disharmonize-prone country may resist such action, since it may be the casher of the imbalances. Exterior agencies can indicate to the demand to reduce horizontal inequalities, only ultimately such policies must depend on domestic actors.
In the short term, policies to change private incentives to fight include providing employment schemes and credit to young men. In the longer term, extending pedagogy and achieving inclusive development will heighten peacetime opportunities. Better control and legitimacy of international markets in drugs, timber, diamonds, etc, should reduce opportunities to turn a profit from illegal trade during war.
Conclusion
Although this article has concentrated on the causes of conflict within countries, much of the analysis is relevant to the international situation. The sharp economical and social differences betwixt Western societies and the Muslim world are a clear example of international horizontal inequalities. These, together with the widespread impoverishment in many Muslim countries, let leaders such as Osama Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein to mobilise support only besides effectively along religious lines.
Tabular array
Examples of horizontal inequality
| Categories of differentiation | Selected examples |
|---|---|
| Political participation | |
| Participation in authorities | Fiji, Republic of burundi, Bosnia and Herzogovinia, Uganda, Sri Lanka |
| Membership of army and police force | Fiji, Northern Ireland, Burundi, Kosova |
| Economical power | |
| Assets: | |
| Land | Fiji, Cambodia, El Salvador, Haiti |
| Privately owned uppercase | Malaysia, South Africa, Burundi |
| Authorities infrastructure | Chiapas, United mexican states, Burundi |
| Aid | Afghanistan, Sudan, Rwanda |
| Natural resources | Liberia, Sierra Leone |
| Employment and incomes: | |
| Incomes | Malaysia, South Africa, Republic of the fiji islands, Chiapas |
| Regime employment | Sri Lanka, Republic of the fiji islands |
| Private employment | Fiji, Uganda, Malaysia |
| Elite employment | Due south Africa, Fiji, Northern Ireland |
| Unemployment | South Africa, Northern Ireland |
| Social access and situation | |
| Education | Rwanda, Burundi, Haiti, South Africa, Northern Republic of uganda, Kosova |
| Health services | Burundi, Northern Uganda, Chiapas |
| Safe drinking water | Uganda, Chiapas |
| Housing | Northern Ireland |
| Poverty | Chiapas, Uganda, South Africa |
Acknowledgments
I thank the editor and 2 referees for their helpful comments.
Footnotes
Competing interests: None declared.
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2002 February 9; 324 (7333) : 342–345.
Commentary: Conflict—from causes to prevention?
Douglas Holdstock
1-1001Medact, 601 Holloway Road, London N19 4DJ, i-1002Medipaz, Apdo Postal P-191, Managua ii, Nicaragua
Antonio Jarquin
1-1001Medact, 601 Holloway Road, London N19 4DJ, 1-1002Medipaz, Apdo Postal P-191, Managua 2, Nicaragua
Modern war is not an expression of innate aggression only an economic and social structure.1-1 It is an attempt to settle, by violence, disputes over political power, territorial and ethnic bug, and societal stresses such every bit injustice and poverty. Information technology is vital to address the roots of conflict. It is as important to reduce the supply of arms, particularly to developing countries, as about all of the approximately thirty currently active conflicts are in less adult countries,1-2 which, as Stewart notes, carry the main burden of deaths from war. Co-ordinate to the UN Development Plan, global military spending has fallen from a cold war pinnacle of about $1 trillion (£709 meg million) to around $750bn in 2000.
Treaties to regulate weapons (principally of mass devastation) do exist,i-three but they need to be ratified by all Un members states, which should allow full scope for verification. It is regrettable that the United States is obstructing verification of the Biological Weapons Convention. Conflicts in developing countries are fought with conventional weapons, particularly pocket-size artillery, which are recycled from i conflict to another and are calorie-free and simple to handle, fifty-fifty by children. The United Nations is attempting to curb the illicit trade in pocket-sized arms, and a more than radical treaty to limit arms transfers is existence promoted by not-governmental organisations such as Oxfam. Destruction of artillery should follow the cease of conflict, and this could exist facilitated past offering combatants retraining in commutation for artillery.1-4
Stewart emphasises the importance of a history of disharmonize and comments that structural factors predisposing to war may persist. Simply many conflicts in developing countries—such as Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua—began every bit cold state of war proxies. The European union has fabricated war between its members effectively unthinkable. Similar bodies, such as the Arrangement for African Unity and others in Asia and Latin America, are developing and are likely to promote similar cohesion. Complimentary dialogue betwixt such groups at all levels is vital to reduce the very existent risk of them condign opposing "superstates" with an ethnic or religious footing.
To play its intended office—to "salvage succeeding generations from the scourge of war"—the United Nations must be reformed and strengthened. Fellow member states must not undertake military action without UN authorisation; its part should not be bars to picking up the pieces after conflict.i-5 Eradication of war will not be easy but can be achieved piecemeal over fourth dimension, and health workers accept a fundamental role.1-vi At that place is a medical model—the elimination of smallpox and shortly of polio by surveillance, treatment, and preventive measures—for turning a vision into reality.
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Source: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1122271/
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